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Abstract 
fMRI studies of how the brain processes sentences containing semantically 
ambiguous words have consistently implicated (i) the left inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG) 
and (ii) posterior regions of the left temporal lobe in processing high-ambiguity 
sentences. This article reviews recent findings on this topic and relates them to (i) 
psycholinguistic theories about the underlying cognitive processes and (ii) general 
neuro-cognitive accounts of the relevant brain regions. We suggest that the LIFG 
plays a general role in the cognitive control process that are necessary to select 
contextually relevant meanings and to reinterpret sentences that were initially 
misunderstood, but it is currently unclear whether these control processes should 
best be characterised in terms of specific processes such as conflict resolution and 
controlled retrieval that are required for high-ambiguity sentences, or whether its 
function is better characterised in terms of a more general set of ‘unification’ 
processes. In contrast to the relatively rapid progress that has been made in 
understanding the function of the LIFG, we suggest that the contribution of the 
posterior temporal lobe is less well understood and future work is needed to clarify 
its role in sentence comprehension.  
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Introduction 
Most words are ambiguous and can refer to multiple different concepts. For 
example, the word “band” can refer either to a group of musicians or to a circular 
strip of material. This form of ambiguity is often referred to as ‘lexical ambiguity’. We 
prefer the term ‘semantic ambiguity’ as this makes it clear that it is the meaning of 
the word that is ambiguous and not its form or grammatical properties.  
Whenever we hear (or read) a semantically ambiguous word it seems that we can 
rapidly retrieve one of its meanings and ignore the other meaning(s). For example, if 
you were asked to define the word “organ” you could rapidly generate an 
appropriate definition (e.g., “a part of the body”), without being overly distracted by 
its alternative meaning (e.g., “a musical instrument”). Similarly, if this word occurred 
in a context that supported just one of its meanings (e.g., “The doctors successfully 
transplanted the organ”) you could rapidly select the appropriate meaning without 
being overly confused by your knowledge of the alternative interpretation. The only 
situation in which we usually become explicitly aware of such ambiguity is the case 
of puns, which are carefully constructed so that both meanings relate to some part 
of the surrounding context. For example, in the joke “Why were the teacher’s eyes 
crossed? Because she couldn’t control her pupils” both meanings of the ambiguous 
word “pupil” (i.e. a student; a part of the eye) are partially consistent with the 
sentence context and both meanings must be accessed for the pun to be 
understood. But such puns are the exception – in natural listening environments 
listeners are usually able to rapidly select the appropriate meaning of a word without 
much apparent effort or awareness (Rodd, Davis, & Johnsrude, 2005).  
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There are different kinds of semantic ambiguities. Sometimes the alternative 
meanings are not related in meaning or etymology, i.e. they do not share a common 
origin within the history of the language. For example, it is a historical accident that 
the two meanings of “bark” (i.e. the sound made by a dog; the outer covering of a 
tree) share both their spelling and pronunciation. These unrelated meanings are 
usually given separate entries in dictionaries and are referred to as homonyms, but 
they can also be referred to as homographs (because they share their spelling) or 
homophones (because they share their pronunciation). True homonyms are 
relatively rare; for example, they constitute only about 7% of common English 
words, (Rodd, Gaskell, & Marslen-Wilson, 2002). English also contains homophones 
that share only their pronunciation (e.g., “meet/meat”, “buy/by”, “there/their/they’re”) 
as well as homographs that only share their spelling (e.g., “sow”, “lead”, and “close”) 
which make these words ambiguous only in spoken or written language 
respectively.   
More common than these unrelated meanings is the ambiguity between 
semantically related word senses - usually referred to as polysemy. For example, 
the word “run” has a range of different dictionary definitions (e.g., “the sprinter runs 
in the race”, “the candidate runs in the election”, “the software runs on the 
computer”) which seem to overlap somewhat in their meanings. In fact the list of 
senses that are explicitly listed in a dictionary is probably only the tip of the iceberg 
in terms of the multitude of ways in which we use these words to express a range of 
subtly different concepts. Additionally, current words continue to acquire new 
meanings that are shared within a language community which will need to be dealt 
with by the comprehension system (Rodd, Berriman, et al., 2012). For example, 
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“tweet”, “tablet”, “spam”, “window”, “blackberry” and many more words have recently 
acquired novel technological meanings.  
These examples demonstrate that many words can only be fully understood by 
taking into account the context in which they occur. Studying the brain mechanisms 
that underlie these semantic disambiguation processes is important for several 
reasons. First, given the ubiquity of semantic ambiguity, these processes are 
fundamental to everyday communication and, thus are a necessary component of 
any complete account of language processing. Second, these words provide a 
window into important cognitive processes, such as selection, inhibition and 
contextual integration, and examining the brain’s responses to such ambiguities can 
likewise elucidate the brain mechanisms that underlie these critical cognitive 
operations. 
The aims of this article are to (i) summarise what is known about the cognitive 
processes involved in semantic ambiguity resolution, (ii) review the key findings 
concerning the brain regions that support these cognitive processes, and (iii) explore 
how these findings relate to general neuro-cognitive accounts of the relevant brain 
regions. 
Cognitive Processes underlying Semantic Ambiguity Resolution 
The neuroimaging literature looking at the brain mechanisms that support semantic 
ambiguity resolution is necessarily grounded in the psycholinguistic literature 
concerning the relevant cognitive processes. This literature has converged on the 
view that when a listener (or reader) encounters an ambiguous word they rapidly 
and automatically retrieve multiple meanings in parallel, and then rapidly select the 
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one that is most likely to be correct (Duffy, Morris, & Rayner, 1988; Rodd, 
Johnsrude, & Davis, 2010; Simpson, 1994; Twilley & Dixon, 2000). This view is 
somewhat counterintuitive and does not fit with most people’s intuitions of what 
happens: when we hear a phrase like “the tree’s bark” we do not usually have any 
conscious experience of retrieving and then having to reject inappropriate meanings.  
According to the early versions of these “exhaustive access” models (so called 
because we ‘exhaustively’ retrieve all possible meanings), all meanings are 
automatically accessed regardless of contextual information or the relative 
frequencies of the words' meanings (also known as meaning dominance) (Onifer & 
Swinney, 1981). This assumption was primarily supported by cross-modal semantic 
priming studies in which participants made responses to visual probe words that 
followed the ambiguous word (e.g., Seidenberg, Tanenhaus, Leiman, & Bienkowski, 
1982; Swinney, 1979), which found that immediately after the ambiguous word, 
responses were faster for probes that were semantically related to either meaning 
(compared to unrelated probes) indicating that both meanings had been 
automatically activated. However, subsequent studies found that if the context 
contained a very strong semantic constraint that indicated that the dominant (more 
frequent) meaning was correct (e.g., “the violent hurricane did not damage the ships 
which were in the PORT), then only the contextually appropriate meaning was 
primed (e.g., Tabossi, 1988; Tabossi & Zardon, 1993). Taken together with 
convergent evidence from eye-movement research (Duffy, Kambe, & Rayner, 2001), 
the field has converged on the view, exemplified in the reordered access model 
(Duffy et al., 2001; Duffy et al., 1988), that multiple meanings are usually activated in 
parallel but this activation is modulated by a combination of the sentence context 
and meaning frequency (e.g., Duffy et al., 2001; MacDonald, Pearlmutter, & 
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Seidenberg, 1994; Simpson, 1994; Twilley & Dixon, 2000). In particular, meanings 
that are highly frequent or very strongly associated with the preceding context are 
more readily available. More recent studies have additionally highlighted the 
contribution of recent experience, demonstrating that we are also biased to select 
recently-encountered meanings ( Rodd, Lopez Cutrin, Kirsch, Millar, & Davis, 2013). 
As well as providing evidence that multiple meanings are usually accessed in 
parallel, the early priming studies found that listeners do not maintain multiple 
meanings for long but instead make a rapid selection within a few hundred 
milliseconds of encountering an ambiguous word even when both meanings are 
consistent with the sentence context (e.g., Seidenberg et al., 1982; Swinney, 1979). 
Seidenberg et al. (1982) proposed that such selection may occur because of limits 
on processing capacity that make it difficult to maintain multiple interpretations in 
parallel (although see Mason & Just, 2007; Miyake, Just, & Carpenter, 1994). One 
unfortunate consequence of ‘early selection’ is that sometimes listeners (and 
readers) will initially select the inappropriate meaning. For example, in the sentence 
“usually the bank is not the place to start if you want to catch a fish in this stream” 
most readers/listeners will initially select the wrong, financial, meaning of “bank”. 
Numerous studies have shown that additional processing is required to recover from 
such misinterpretations (e.g., Duffy et al., 1988; Kambe, Rayner, & Duffy, 2001; 
Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 2010).  
In summary, current research suggests that whenever an ambiguous word is 
encountered multiple meanings are initially activated, but that a single meaning is 
then rapidly selected on the basis of the immediate sentence context, the frequency 
(dominance) of the different meanings, and recent experience with the word. The 
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exact fate of the non-selected meaning, however, is uncertain. For example, non-
selected meanings may be completely suppressed (Gernsbacher & St John, 2001; 
MacDonald et al., 1994) or retain a low level of activation (McRae, Spivey-Knowlton, 
& Tanenhaus, 1998). This psycholinguistic research provides a well-informed 
cognitive foundation to examine the neural basis underlying the different processes 
that are required to understand a sentence that contains an ambiguous word. 
The Neural Network underlying Semantic Ambiguity Resolution  
The first fMRI study to investigate semantic ambiguity resolution within sentence 
contexts was conducted by Rodd et al. (2005). Participants listened to spoken 
sentences that each contained several ambiguous words (e.g., “There were dates 
and pears on the kitchen table”). Activation was greater for ambiguous than well-
matched unambiguous sentences in the left inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG) and a 
region of the left posterior temporal cortex that included the inferior temporal gyrus 
(LITG), fusiform and middle temporal gyrus (LMTG), and (to a lesser extent) the 
right inferior frontal gyrus (RIFG).  
The specific regions highlighted by this early study were surprising for several 
reasons. First, the LIFG activation resided in its middle and posterior sub-divisions 
(pars triangularis and pars opercularis), which were traditionally attributed to either 
speech production (e.g., Broca, 1861; Geschwind, 1970; Indefrey & Levelt, 2004; 
Penfield & Roberts, 1959) or to non-semantic linguistic aspects of comprehension, 
including syntactic computations (e.g., Caplan, Alpert, & Waters, 1998; Caramazza 
& Zurif, 1976; Dapretto & Bookheimer, 1999; Grodzinsky, 1986). Second, when prior 
research had attributed the LIFG to semantic processing, it was often highlighted as 
being important for explicit semantic decisions that required the strategic retrieval, 
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maintenance or selection of semantic information rather than for natural speech 
comprehension (Crinion, Lambon-Ralph, Warburton, Howard, & Wise, 2003; 
Gabrieli, Poldrack, & Desmond, 1998; Novick, Trueswell, & Thompson-Schill, 2005; 
Thompson-Schill, D'Esposito, Aguirre, & Farah, 1997; Wagner, Paré-Blagoev, Clark, 
& Poldrack, 2001). However, in Rodd et al.’s (2005) study, LIFG activation was 
higher for ambiguous sentences despite the fact that participants were not usually 
aware of the ambiguity and did not rate them as sounding less natural. Such 
activation in the absence of explicit awareness makes it unlikely that they were due 
to strategic processes, and suggested a more routine involvement of this region in 
the semantic aspects of natural sentence comprehension. Furthermore, the 
posterior temporal activation was intriguing because it contrasted with accounts that 
highlighted anterior temporal structures as being important for semantic processing 
(Chan et al., 2001; Mummery et al., 2000; Nobre, Allison, & McCarthy, 1994).  
This simple contrast between high- and low-ambiguity sentences provided a useful 
way of identifying the overall network of brain regions that are recruited by high-
ambiguity sentences. Experiments using these stimuli have subsequently shown 
that these aspects of speech comprehension are (i) substantially disrupted when 
participants are even lightly sedated using an anaesthetic drug (Davis et al.; 2007), 
and (ii) seen in a small number of patients who were clinically diagnosed as being in 
a vegetative state or minimally conscious (Coleman et al., 2009; Coleman et al., 
2007).  However, the stimuli in these studies were heterogeneous in terms of their 
properties and were likely loading on a range of different cognitive processes 
associated with disambiguation, which means they cannot reveal the specific 
cognitive roles of the individual regions within this network. 
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Subsequent fMRI studies have used a range of more specific types of high-
ambiguity sentences to provide further clues about the precise functional roles of 
these key brain regions (Bekinschtein, Davis, Rodd, & Owen, 2011; Davis et al., 
2007; Mason & Just, 2007; Rodd et al., 2005; Rodd, Johnsrude, & Davis, 2012; 
Rodd, Longe, Randall, & Tyler, 2010; Vitello, Warren, Devlin & Rodd, 2014; 
Zempleni, Renken, Hoeks, Hoogduin, & Stowe, 2007; see Johnsrude & Rodd, in 
press, for review; see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Left hemisphere regions that have been shown to have greater BOLD 
signal for semantically ambiguous than unambiguous sentences. (Structural scan 
from single participant rendered using FSL (Jenkinson, Beckmann, Behrens, 
Woolrich, & Smith, 2012). 
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Functional Contribution of the LIFG  
The LIFG is the most consistent brain region that shows increased BOLD signal for 
high-ambiguity sentences, being reported in all published studies of ambiguity 
resolution that use sentence materials (Bekinschtein et al., 2011; Davis et al., 2007; 
Mason & Just, 2007; Rodd et al., 2005; Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 2012; Rodd, Longe, 
et al., 2010; Rodd, Vitello, Woollams & Adank, 2015; Tahmasebi  et al., 2012; 
Zempleni et al., 2007). Additionally, a recent study (Vitello, Warren, Devlin, & Rodd, 
2014) has confirmed the reliability of this effect across individuals: 80% of 
participants showed an ambiguity-related response within a single subdivision of the 
LIFG: pars triangularis. Importantly, the LIFG responds to different types of 
ambiguous sentences that load differently on the different cognitive components of 
disambiguation, suggesting that this region supports multiple aspects of 
disambiguation, including (i) the initial selection between alternative interpretations 
and (ii) the subsequent reinterpretation of any sentences that have been initially 
misunderstood.  
The most direct evidence for its role in selecting between multiple possible 
meanings comes from a second study using spoken materials (Rodd et al., 2012) 
which found activation within an LIFG region of interest that extended across both 
pars triangularis and pars opercularis for spoken sentences in which disambiguating 
information preceded the ambiguous word (e.g., “the hunter thought that the 
hare/hair in the field was actually a rabbit”). According to psycholinguistic theories, 
sentences of this type should only load on the processes of selecting the correct 
meaning and inhibiting the inappropriate meaning. This study also provided 
evidence for a role of this region in sentence reinterpretation by observing the time-
course of responses to high-ambiguity sentences in which the ambiguous words 
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were preceded by a neutral context that was consistent with both meanings. 
Specifically, spoken sentences in which disambiguating information was presented 
only a few words after the ambiguous word (e.g., “the scientist thought that the film 
on the water was from the pollution”) produced greater responses in early 
processing time-windows than sentences in which context was delayed until several 
words later (“e.g., the ecologist thought that the plant by the river should be closed 
down”). In contrast the latter sentences produced more activation in later time-
windows. This difference in the time-course between these conditions  indicates that 
the activation could not solely reflect responses to the ambiguous word itself, which 
occurred at the same time for the two types of sentences, and must therefore have 
been driven by the disambiguating information, and so is likely to reflect the 
reinterpretation process triggered by this information. This activation profile was 
seen in a large cluster of activation within the LIFG that has its peak in the posterior 
portion of pars triangularis, but extended posteriorly into the pars opercularis and 
precentral gyrus, and anteriorly into pars orbitalis.  
This view that the LIFG is important for sentence reinterpretation is further 
supported by three studies, using both visually and auditorily presented materials, 
which have used sentences where the disambiguation comes towards the end of the 
sentence (e.g., “the woman had to make the toast with a very old microphone "), 
and which specifically manipulated the dominance (i.e. relative frequency) of the 
meaning of the ambiguous word that was used in the sentence. The reinterpretation 
account predicts that activation should be greatest for these sentences when the 
non-preferred (subordinate) meaning of an ambiguous word is used as these are 
most likely to require reinterpretation. Mason and Just (2007) report increased 
activation in a large region of the LIFG for visually presented sentences of this type 
13 
 
(compared with low-ambiguity control sentences), but also show that a small 
anterior/ventral subregion of the LIFG near the border of pars triangularis and pars 
orbitalis (as well as the insula) was most active for subordinate ambiguities 
compared with ambiguities with two more balanced meanings. Zempleni et al., 
(2007) again used visually presented sentences and found an ambiguity effect in a 
more posterior region of the LIFG (pars opercularis/triangularis), that was sensitive 
to sentence dominance, such that there was more activation when the non-preferred 
meaning was used. Finally, Vitello et al., (2014) confirmed the presence of a similar 
dominance effect for spoken sentences: activation in a large region within the LIFG, 
that had its peak in pars triangularis, was modulated by the dominance of the 
ambiguous word’s meaning such that activation was greater for sentences which 
disambiguated towards the subordinate meaning compared with more balanced 
ambiguities. These three experiments are all consistent with the view that the LIFG 
is recruited more by a condition in which reinterpretation is most likely, although the 
reason for the apparent variation in the precise sub-region of the LIFG that is 
activated is as yet unclear.  These studies also suggest that recruitment of the LIFG 
for ambiguity-related processing occurs regardless of input modality, although it is 
as yet unknown whether the different processing loads associated with spoken and 
visual language (e.g., transient versus long-lasting signal) might modulate the 
involvement of these regions. Direct comparisons of these two modalities and 
ambiguity resolution have not yet been conducted.      
One final piece of experimental evidence concerning the role of the LIFG in 
ambiguity resolution comes from another study using spoken materials from Rodd, 
Longe et al. (2010) who found that (within the same group of participants) the same 
posterior LIFG region (peak in pars opercularis) was activated for both semantic 
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ambiguities and syntactically ambiguous sentences (e.g., “visiting relatives 
is/are…”). This indicates that this region is not specialized for processing semantic 
information, but instead provides a more general resource that can be utilised for a 
range of different types of ambiguity.  
This finding that recruitment of this region is not specific to semantic ambiguities is 
consistent with studies that report activation in this region for a wide range of 
different types of sentences, which do not contain semantic ambiguities, but instead 
require additional sentence-level contextual processing due to the presence of a 
linguistic violations, such as semantically or syntactically anomalous words 
(Baumgaertner, Weiller, & Büchel, 2002; Hagoort et al., 2004; Kuperberg, Sitnikova, 
& Lakshmanan, 2008; Zhu et al., 2012, see also Lau, Phillips & Poeppel, 2006 for a 
review of relevant ERP studies) or syntactically complex structure (Bornkessel-
Schlesewsky, Schlesewsky, and von Cramon, 2009; Just, Carpenter, Keller, Eddy,&  
Thulborn, 1996; see Rodd et al., 2015 for detailed review and formal meta-analysis). 
This region is also activated by a wide range of semantic tasks that use non-
sentential stimuli, such as studies in which participants make explicit semantic 
judgements to word pairs/triples that contain ambiguous words (e.g., SUMMER-FAN 
vs. CEILING-FAN; Bedny, McGill, & Thompson-Schill, 2008; Whitney, Kirk, 
O'Sullivan, Lambon Ralph, & Jefferies, 2011) and high-competition verb generation 
or picture naming tasks (e.g., Kan & Thompson-Schill, 2004; Persson et al., 2004; 
Thompson-Schill et al., 1997). This view that semantic ambiguity resolution relies on 
relatively general neural mechanisms is also consistent with evidence from dual-task 
methodologies that indicate the involvement of relatively general cognitive 
mechanisms (Rodd, Johnsrude & Davis, 2010). It is therefore important to view its 
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role in the context of other more general neuro-cognitive accounts of LIFG function 
(see Novick et al., 2005; Rogalsky & Hickok, 2011). 
One important theory of LIFG function is the conflict resolution account (Novick, 
Kan, Trueswell, & Thompson-Schill, 2009; Novick et al., 2005; Thompson-Schill et 
al., 1997), which suggests that the role of the posterior LIFG (pars opercularis and 
pars triangularis) is to resolve competition between activated representations. This 
theory follows the bias competition framework whereby the prefrontal cortex 
provides top-down bias signals to information processing in other brain regions to 
support context-appropriate behaviour (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Miller & Cohen, 
2001). Specifically, Novick et al. (2009) suggested that the LIFG supports conflict 
resolution either when there is a prepotent but irrelevant response, or when multiple 
representations are available but no dominant response exists. The former situation 
occurs for ambiguous words with one strongly dominant (i.e. prepotent) but 
contextually inappropriate meaning (e.g., “the sheep was in the pen”); the latter 
occurs for words with two equally likely meanings in a neutral context (e.g.., “he 
mentioned the organ”). Strong support for the LIFG’s role in both types of conflict 
resolution comes from a diverse range of neuroimaging studies outside the field of 
sentence comprehension. These studies employed tasks including verb generation 
or picture naming, where stimuli are associated with several possible responses 
(Kan & Thompson-Schill, 2004; Persson et al., 2004; Thompson-Schill et al., 1997), 
semantic decision tasks in which the stimuli evoke strongly associated, but task-
irrelevant, responses  (Badre, Poldrack, Paré-Blagoev, Insler, & Wagner, 2005; 
Thompson-Schill et al., 1997) and representational interference paradigms, such as 
Stroop tasks (January, Trueswell, & Thompson-Schill, 2009; Milham, Banich, & 
Barad, 2003). 
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In contrast to this proposed role for the posterior LIFG in conflict resolution, Badre 
and colleagues specifically attribute the anterior LIFG (pars orbitalis) to controlled 
retrieval of semantic information from long-term memory (Badre et al., 2005; Badre 
& Wagner, 2007). This process is required when stimulus-driven cues are 
insufficient to activate information relevant to one’s goal or task. Various 
neuroimaging studies that manipulated semantic context between pairs of words 
and sentences show support for this theory by, for example, finding increased 
activity for semantically unrelated conditions than baseline (see Lau, Philips & 
Poeppel, 2006 for a review). In addition, a recent TMS study provides support for a 
causal role of this region in controlled semantic retrieval by showing that stimulating 
the LIFG impaired performance on semantic decision tasks for conditions with weak, 
but not strong, semantic associates (Whitney, Kirk, O'Sullivan, Lambon Ralph, & 
Jefferies, 2011).  This retrieval process may be critical for ambiguous sentences that 
refer to the subordinate meaning of an ambiguous word, as these meanings are 
more weakly associated to the ambiguous words than their dominant meaning.  
In summary, the data from studies looking at semantic ambiguities in sentences are 
fully consistent with the view that the function of the LIFG should be characterised in 
terms of conflict resolution (posterior LIFG) and controlled retrieval (anterior LIFG). 
However it is important to note that the evidence for this dissociation between the 
functions of posterior and anterior subregions comes largely from studies using 
single words – there is currently no evidence from within the semantic ambiguity 
literature to support this dissociation (see Rodd et al., 2012). 
An alternative, and more general, explanation for why the LIFG is recruited by 
semantically ambiguous sentences comes from Hagoort and colleagues (Hagoort, 
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2005, 2013). According to this theory, the LIFG constitutes a unification space that 
combines basic units of information to form larger complex representations of a 
sentence or discourse. In contrast to the conflict resolution account, which ascribes 
very specific functions to the LIFG, this unification account argues that it is the 
combinatorial demands, i.e. the need to combine together the representations of 
individual words, that drives LIFG activation. The need to resolve conflicts between 
competing representations and select contextually relevant semantic information are 
just one specific function of a more general sentence processing resource.  
The substantial overlap between this unification account and the view that the LIFG 
is more specifically associated with conflict resolution and controlled retrieval has 
made it difficult to determine which account provides a better characterization of the 
function of the LIFG. Some authors have suggested that the key to discriminating 
between these accounts is to consider the extent to which the LIFG is activated by 
low-ambiguity sentences (see Vitello et al., 2014). While the conflict 
resolution/controlled retrieval accounts clearly predicts that low-ambiguity sentences 
should place minimal load on the LIFG, the unification view seems to suggest that 
although ambiguity places an increased demand on this region, the LIFG should be 
routinely activated by all sentences, even those with relatively low levels of 
ambiguity as, even for low-ambiguity sentences, the listener/reader must combine 
together the meanings of the individual words.  
In general, the available data supports the former view - that the LIFG is not 
necessary for language comprehension for low-ambiguity sentences. For example, 
patients with “Broca’s Aphasia” or damage to the LIFG itself have relatively 
preserved comprehension of single words and simple sentences (Caplan, 
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Hildebrandt, & Makris, 1996; Caramazza & Zurif, 1976; Schwartz, Saffran, & Marin, 
1980; Yee, Blumstein, & Sedivy, 2008) and can produce and comprehend 
sentences that have low conflict demands, such as those with dominant 
interpretations (Novick et al., 2009; Robinson, Shallice, & Cipolotti, 2005). In 
addition, neuroimaging studies do not always report significantly greater activation in 
the LIFG for simple or unambiguous sentences over baseline (e.g., Crinion et al., 
2003; Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 2012; Scott, Blank, Rosen, & Wise, 2000; Spitsyna, 
Warren, Scott, Turkheimer, & Wise, 2006). In particular, a recent study found that 
the region of the LIFG that showed an ambiguity response showed no significant 
response to sentences without an ambiguous word, compared with an unintelligible 
baseline condition (Vitello, et al., 2014). This finding suggests this region may not be 
routinely involved during speech comprehension of low-ambiguity speech and that 
they may therefore perform functions that are more pertinent to ambiguity resolution 
than sentence processing in general. (Although see Hagoort, Hald, Bastiaansen, & 
Petersson, 2004; Rodd et al., 2005; Willems, Özyürek, & Hagoort, 2007 for 
contrasting findings). 
However the absence of frontal activation for low-ambiguity sentences cannot allow 
us to completely rule out the unification account. First, this account can be 
reconciled with these findings by assuming that the LIFG is also being recruited by 
the baseline unintelligible sentences, for example by any stimulus-independent 
thought processes that participants may engage in when not being required to 
process speech (Binder et al., 1999). If this is the case then the LIFG may indeed be 
being activated for the low-ambiguity sentences, but this activation is not observed 
using standard analysis approaches because it is ‘subtracted out’ when contrasted 
with the baseline conditions (see Vitello, 2014 for further discussion). Alternatively, it 
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is possible that low-ambiguity sentences do not in fact always recruit unification 
processes. For example, according to the ‘good enough’ approach to language 
comprehension (Ferreira, Bailey, & Ferraro, 2002; Ferreira, & Patson, 2007) 
listeners/readers may often process language in a relatively shallow manner that 
focuses on the local properties of individual words and may not engage in higher 
level integration processes unless the demands of their current situation requires 
them to do so.   
A second aspect in which the unification account differs from other accounts of LIFG 
function is that it explicitly proposes functional specialisation across the LIFG in 
terms of type of linguistic information. Based on a literature review by Bookheimer 
(2002), Hagoort (2005) argued that different types of information are processed 
between large overlapping regions. Specifically, semantic information is 
preferentially processed by pars orbitalis and pars triangularis, syntactic information 
by pars triangularis and par opercularis and phonological processes by pars 
opercularis and premotor cortex. Such a division has recently been supported by a 
resting state study showing different patterns of functional connectivity between the 
three sub-regions, suggesting that they form parts of different information 
processing streams (Xiang, Fonteijn, Norris, & Hagoort, 2010). This view of 
functional segregation of the LIFG on the basis of the linguistic nature of the 
ambiguity is compatible with a recent meta-analysis of sentence comprehension 
(Hagoort & Indefrey, 2014), but is inconsistent with a second formal meta-analyses 
that found that both semantic and syntactic aspects of sentence comprehension are 
both primarily associated with the posterior LIFG (Rodd et al., 2014) as well the 
finding from Rodd, Longe, et al. (2010) that semantic and syntactic ambiguities 
recruit similar regions of the posterior LIFG. Thus, while there is some evidence to 
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support the view that anatomical subdivisions of the LIFG are associated with 
different types of linguistic information, it remains unclear, why semantic ambiguities 
are primarily associated with posterior and not anterior LIFG, as might have been 
expected.  
One possible way in which this inconsistency might be resolved is to note that a 
variety of phonological processes have been associated with the posterior LIFG 
(pars opercularis). Aside from phonological unification (Hagoort, 2005, 2013) this 
region has been specifically associated with maintaining phonological 
representations (Nixon, Lazarova, Hodinott-Hill, Gough, & Passingham, 2004), 
articulatory operations (Hickok & Poeppel, 2007) and phonological sub-vocal 
rehearsal (Rogalsky, Matchin, & Hickok, 2008). These theories have received 
support from a variety of neuroimaging, TMS and lesion studies, employing 
paradigms such as letter/word rhyming judgements (Baldo & Dronkers, 2006; 
Gough, Nobre, & Devlin, 2005), delayed phonological matching of 
words/pseudowords (Nixon et al., 2004; Strand, Forssberg, Klingberg, & Norrelgen, 
2008) and concurrent comprehension and articulation tasks (Rogalsky et al., 2008) . 
While most cognitive theories of semantic ambiguity resolution do not highlight 
phonological-based mechanisms, it is possible that the phonological working 
memory aspects of semantic reinterpretation may place a load on such operations, 
making these accounts broadly consistent with the finding of ambiguity-related 
activation in this region.  
In summary, several very different theories of LIFG function, which were not 
developed primarily to explain semantic ambiguity effects, can explain the 
involvement of this region in ambiguity resolution, but several unresolved questions 
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remain. In particular further work is needed to determine precisely which 
subregion(s) of the LIFG contributes to ambiguity resolution in light of converging 
research outside the field of ambiguity that suggests there is functional 
specialisations across the LIFG either in terms of linguistic content 
(anterior/semantic – posterior/phonological) or processing (anterior/controlled 
semantic retrieval – posterior/semantic selection). It is currently unclear whether and 
how these different subregions might make different specific contributions to 
ambiguity resolution. For example, Rodd et al. (2012) report a very large cluster of 
ambiguity-related activation that extends across all three anatomical sub-divisions of 
the LIFG (pars opercularis; pars triangularis; pars orbitalis), but, despite including a 
range of different types of sentences which were designed to load differently on the 
different cognitive components (i.e. selection between meanings; semantic 
reinterpretation), they found no evidence for functional specialization across these 
subdivisions.  
Finally it is important to note that although this review has focused on the left IFG 
there is some evidence for activation in the homologous right hemisphere region, 
although in most studies this is either weaker than that found in the left hemisphere 
(Mason & Just, 2007; Rodd et al., 2005; Zempleni et al., 2007) or does not reach the 
required significance levels (Bekinschtein et al., 2011; Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 
2012; Rodd, Longe, et al., 2010; Vitello et al., 2014). The involvement of right 
hemisphere regions is of particular interest given claims that it plays a specific role 
in maintaining non-selected meanings in case subsequent reinterpretation is needed 
(e.g., Faust & Chiarello, 1998; Faust & Gernsbacher, 1996). Future work is needed 
to determine what (if any) functional contribution is made by the right IFG to 
semantic disambiguation (see Rodd et al., 2005).  
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Functional Contribution of left Posterior Temporal Cortex  
The left posterior inferior temporal cortex is the second region that is often activated 
alongside the LIFG in response to semantically ambiguous sentences (Davis et al., 
2007; Rodd et al., 2005; Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 2012; Tahmasebi et al., 2012; 
Zempleni et al., 2007). In contrast to frontal regions, temporal lobe activation has 
only been found for those ambiguous sentences where reinterpretation is likely to be 
required (Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 2012; Rodd, Longe, et al., 2010; Zempleni et al., 
2007; Vitello et al., 2014).  
There are two different interpretations of this finding. One possibility is that, unlike 
frontal regions, the posterior temporal lobe may make a relatively pure contribution 
to the reinterpretation aspect of semantic disambiguation (Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 
2012). An alternative explanation is that because reinterpretation is the most 
cognitive demanding aspect of semantic disambiguation (Johnsrude & Rodd, in 
press), it is the only aspect of disambiguation that produces a neural signal that is 
sufficiently strong to be observed using current methods, given the very 
considerable variability in the reported anatomical locations for these temporal lobe 
ambiguity-related activations, which have been seen in several functionally-distinct 
regions. While the most commonly activated regions are the posterior inferior 
temporal gyrus (Bekinschtein et al., 2011; Davis et al., 2007; Rodd et al., 2005; 
Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 2012; Zempleni et al., 2007) and the posterior middle 
temporal gyrus (Rodd et al., 2005; Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 2012; Zempleni et al., 
2007), activation has also been seen more ventrally within the fusiform gyrus 
(Bekinschtein et al., 2011; Rodd et al., 2005; Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 2012) and 
more superiorly in the posterior STS (Rodd et al., 2005) (Price & Devlin, 2011). It is 
currently unclear whether these discrepancies reflect inter-subject functional 
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variability and/or relate, instead, to systematic differences in the ambiguous stimuli 
or experimental protocols used between studies. Some evidence for inter-subject 
variability comes from Vitello et al. (2014), who found that, while almost all subjects 
showed peaks in inferior temporal regions (ITG, occipitotemporal sulcus, fusiform 
gyrus), no single subregion showed consistent activation across the majority of 
participants.  
This relatively restricted set of data about when ambiguity related activation is seen 
in posterior temporal cortex (i.e. just for when reinterpretation is required), together 
with the uncertainty about exactly where the activation is observed, makes it 
challenging, and perhaps premature, to relate these findings to current 
neurobiological accounts of this brain region. While explanations of the ambiguity-
related activation in LIFG have broadly converged on the idea that this region 
supports cognitive control operations needed to resolve semantic ambiguities, there 
has been no equivalent convergence of the field with respect to the role of posterior 
temporal cortex. Different authors have linked their observed ambiguity effects to a 
heterogeneous set of cognitive processes. 
One possibility is that this region plays a key role in the representation of the lexical-
semantic information, either specifically in terms of the sound to meaning mapping 
that is required for spoken words (Hickok & Poeppel, 2004, 2007), or perhaps for 
more abstract representations of words and their meanings (Snijders et al., 2009). 
This view is consistent with several findings from the field of syntactic ambiguity 
research. First, Snijders et al., (2009) found that the posterior middle temporal gyrus 
responds to the presence of syntactically ambiguous words themselves irrespective 
of whether they occur within a sentential context, leading them to conclude that this 
24 
 
region subserves “the retrieval of lexical-syntactic information from memory”. 
Second, a magnetoencephalography (MEG) study of syntactic ambiguity that 
tracked the spatial distribution of neural responses over time (Tyler et al., 2013) 
indicated that the posterior temporal response preceded the subsequent LIFG 
response, leading them to conclude that the posterior temporal lobe “represents and 
transmits lexical information to the LIFG”. Under this view this region is activated for 
high-ambiguity sentences because of the increased amount of lexical-semantic 
information that must be retrieved for such sentences. 
However, other possible interpretations of these posterior temporal activations for 
high-ambiguity sentences remain. A second possibility is that, like the LIFG, the 
posterior temporal cortex plays a key role in cognitive control. Support for this view 
comes from a range of recent studies with both patients and healthy controls that 
associate this region with the semantic control processes that modulate access to 
stored semantic representations (Whitney et al., 2011; Jefferies, 2013). A third, 
distinct possibility is that the ambiguity related activations reflects processing of 
visual based semantic/orthographic information that could potentially aid in the 
resolution of ambiguities (Cohen, Jobert, Le Bihan, & Dehaene, 2004; Martin, 2007; 
Price & Devlin, 2003, 2011).  
Summary 
In summary, fMRI studies of semantic ambiguity resolution in speech have been 
remarkably consistent in finding significant activation in the posterior (and to a lesser 
extent) anterior LIFG. This is highly consistent with current neurobiological accounts 
of this region which focus on its role in either controlling the selection/retrieval of 
semantic information (Novick et al., 2009; Novick et al., 2005; Thompson-Schill et 
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al., 1997), or in combining together the representations of individual words to form 
coherent representations of sentences or longer pieces of discourse (Hagoort, 2005, 
2013). In contrast the activations seen in the posterior temporal lobe remain 
somewhat of a mystery – while the presence of such activations is highly replicable, 
their precise location is highly variable making it challenging to link these observed 
activations with current neurobiological accounts of the contribution of these regions 
to other aspects of cognition. We anticipate that this issue will only be adequately 
resolved when additional, anatomically precise, data is available about the 
responses of the different anatomical subregions in response to a range of different 
forms of linguistic ambiguity. 
References 
Badre, D., Poldrack, R. A., Paré-Blagoev, E. J., Insler, R. Z., & Wagner, A. D. 
(2005). Dissociable controlled retrieval and generalized selection 
mechanisms in ventrolateral prefrontal cortex. Neuron, 47(6), 907-918. 
Badre, D., & Wagner, A. D. (2007). Left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and the 
cognitive control of memory. Neuropsychologia, 45(13), 2883-2901. 
Baldo, J. V., & Dronkers, N. F. (2006). The role of inferior parietal and inferior frontal 
cortex in working memory. Neuropsychology, 20(5), 529. 
Bedny, M., McGill, M., & Thompson-Schill, S. L. (2008). Semantic adaptation and 
competition during word comprehension. Cerebral Cortex, 18(11), 2574-
2585. 
Bekinschtein, T. A., Davis, M. H., Rodd, J. M., & Owen, A. M. (2011). Why Clowns 
Taste Funny: The Relationship between Humor and Semantic Ambiguity. 
Journal of Neuroscience, 31(26), 9665-9671. 
26 
 
Binder, J., Frost, J. A., Hammeke, T. A., Bellgowan, P. S., Rao, S. M., & Cox, R. W. 
(1999). Conceptual processing during the conscious resting state. A 
functional MRI study. J Cogn Neurosci, 11(1), 80-95.  
Bornkessel-Schlesewsky, I., Schlesewsky, M. D., & von Cramon, Y. (2009). Word 
order and Broca’s region: Evidence for a supra-syntactic perspective. Brain 
and Language, 111, 125–139. 
Broca, P. (1861). Perte de la parole, ramollissement chronique et destruction 
partielle du lobe antérieur gauche du cerveau. Bull Soc Anthropol, 2, 235-
238. 
Caplan, D., Alpert, N., & Waters, G. (1998). Effects of syntactic structure and 
propositional number on patterns of regional cerebral blood flow. Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 10(4), 541-552. 
Caplan, D., Hildebrandt, N., & Makris, N. (1996). Location of lesions in stroke 
patients with deficits in syntactic processing in sentence comprehension. 
Brain, 119(3), 933-949. 
Caramazza, A., & Zurif, E. B. (1976). Dissociation of Algorithmic and Heuristic 
Processes in Language Comprehension - Evidence from Aphasia. Brain and 
Language, 3(4), 572-582. 
Chan, D., Fox, N. C., Scahill, R. I., Crum, W. R., Whitwell, J. L., Leschziner, G., et 
al. (2001). Patterns of temporal lobe atrophy in semantic dementia and 
Alzheimer's disease. Annals of neurology, 49(4), 433-442. 
Cohen, L., Jobert, A., Le Bihan, D., & Dehaene, S. (2004). Distinct unimodal and 
multimodal regions for word processing in the left temporal cortex. 
NeuroImage, 23(4), 1256-1270. 
27 
 
Coleman, M. R., Davis, M. H., Rodd, J. M., Robson, T., Ali, A., Owen, A. M., et al. 
(2009). Towards the routine use of brain imaging to aid the clinical diagnosis 
of disorders of consciousness. Brain, 132, 2541-2552. 
Coleman, M. R., Rodd, J. M., Davis, M. H., Johnsrude, I. S., Menon, D. K., Pickard, 
J. D., et al. (2007). Do vegetative patients retain aspects of language 
comprehension? Evidence from fMRI. Brain, 130, 2494-2507. 
Crinion, J. T., Lambon-Ralph, M. A., Warburton, E. A., Howard, D., & Wise, R. J. S. 
(2003). Temporal lobe regions engaged during normal speech 
comprehension. Brain, 126(5), 1193-1201. 
Dapretto, M., & Bookheimer, S. Y. (1999). Form and content: dissociating syntax 
and semantics in sentence comprehension. Neuron, 24(2), 427-432. 
Davis, M. H., Coleman, M. R., Absalom, A. R., Rodd, J. M., Johnsrude, I. S., Matta, 
B. F., et al. (2007). Dissociating speech perception and comprehension at 
reduced levels of awareness. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the United States of America, 104(41), 16032-16037. 
Desimone, R., & Duncan, J. (1995). Neural mechanisms of selective visual 
attention. Annual review of neuroscience, 18(1), 193-222. 
Duffy, S. A., Kambe, G., & Rayner, K. (2001). The effect of prior disambiguating 
context on the comprehension of ambiguous words: Evidence from eye 
movements. In D. S. Gorfein (Ed.), On the consequences of meaning 
selection: Perspectives on resolving lexical ambiguity. Washington, DC: 
American Psychological Association. 
Duffy, S. A., Morris, R. K., & Rayner, K. (1988). Lexical ambiguity and fixation times 
in reading. Journal of Memory and Language, 27(4), 429-446. 
Faust, M. E., & Chiarello, C. (1998). Sentence context and lexical ambiguity 
resolution by the two hemispheres. Neuropsychologia, 36(9), 827-835. 
28 
 
Faust, M. E., & Gernsbacher, M. A. (1996). Cerebral mechanisms for suppression of 
inappropriate information during sentence comprehension. Brain Lang, 
53(2), 234-259. 
Ferreira, F., Bailey, K. G. D., & Ferraro, V. (2002). Good-enough representations in 
language comprehension. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 11, 
11-15. 
Ferreira, F. & Patson, N.D. (2007). The ‘good enough’ approach to language 
comprehension. Language and Linguistics Compass, 1, 71–83. 
Gabrieli, J. D., Poldrack, R. A., & Desmond, J. E. (1998). The role of left prefrontal 
cortex in language and memory. Proceedings of the national Academy of 
Sciences, 95(3), 906-913. 
Gernsbacher, M. A., & St John, M. F. (2001). Modeling suppression in lexical 
access. On the consequences of meaning selection: Perspectives on 
resolving lexical ambiguity, 47-65. 
Geschwind, N. (1970). The organization of language and the brain. Science, 
170(961), 940-944. 
Gough, P. M., Nobre, A. C., & Devlin, J. T. (2005). Dissociating linguistic processes 
in the left inferior frontal cortex with transcranial magnetic stimulation. 
Journal of Neuroscience, 25(35), 8010-8016. 
Grodzinsky, Y. (1986). Language deficits and the theory of syntax. Brain and 
language, 27(1), 135-159. 
Hagoort, P. (2005). On Broca, brain, and binding: A new framework. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 9(9), 416-423. 
Hagoort, P. (2013). MUC (Memory, Unification, Control) and beyond. Front Psychol, 
4, 416. 
29 
 
Hagoort, P., Hald, L., Bastiaansen, M., & Petersson, K. M. (2004). Integration of 
word meaning and world knowledge in language comprehension. Science, 
304(5669), 438-441. 
Hagoort, P. & Indefrey, P. (2014). The neurobiology of language beyond single 
words. Annual Review of Neuroscience. 37, 347-362. 
Hickok, G., & Poeppel, D. (2004). Dorsal and ventral streams: a framework for 
understanding aspects of the functional anatomy of language. Cognition, 
92(1), 67-99. 
Hickok, G., & Poeppel, D. (2007). The cortical organization of speech processing. 
Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 8(5), 393-402. 
Indefrey, P., & Levelt, W. J. (2004). The spatial and temporal signatures of word 
production components. Cognition, 92(1), 101-144. 
January, D., Trueswell, J. C., & Thompson-Schill, S. L. (2009). Co-localization of 
Stroop and syntactic ambiguity resolution in Broca's area: Implications for 
the neural basis of sentence processing. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 
21(12), 2434-2444. 
Jefferies, E. (2013). The neural basis of semantic cognition: converging evidence 
from neuropsychology, neuroimaging and TMS. Cortex, 49(3), 611-625. 
Jenkinson, M., Beckmann, C. F., Behrens, T. E. J., Woolrich, M. W., & Smith, S. M. 
(2012). Fsl. Neuroimage, 62(2), 782-790. 
Johnsrude, I.S., & Rodd, J.M. (in press). Factors that increase processing load when 
listening to speech. In Hickok, G. & Small, S. (Eds),  Neuobiology of 
Language. Elsevier.  
Just MA, Carpenter PA, Keller TA, Eddy WF, Thulborn KR (1996) Brain activation 
modulated by sentence comprehension. Science 274, 114–116. 
30 
 
Kambe, G., Rayner, K., & Duffy, S. A. (2001). Global context effects on processing 
lexically ambiguous words: Evidence from eye fixations. Memory & 
Cognition, 29(2), 363-372. 
Kan, I. P., & Thompson-Schill, S. L. (2004). Effect of name agreement on prefrontal 
activity during overt and covert picture naming. Cognitive, Affective, & 
Behavioral Neuroscience, 4(1), 43-57. 
Lau, E. F., Phillips, C., & Poeppel, D. (2008). A cortical network for semantics: 
(De)constructing the N400. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 9 920-933. 
MacDonald, M. C., Pearlmutter, N. J., & Seidenberg, M. S. (1994). The lexical 
nature of syntactic ambiguity resolution [corrected]. Psychol Rev, 101(4), 
676-703. 
Martin, A. (2007). The representation of object concepts in the brain. Annu. Rev. 
Psychol., 58, 25-45. 
Mason, R. A., & Just, M. A. (2007). Lexical ambiguity in sentence comprehension. 
Brain Research, 1146(1), 115-127. 
McRae, K., Spivey-Knowlton, M. J., & Tanenhaus, M. K. (1998). Modeling the 
influence of thematic fit (and other constraints) in on-line sentence 
comprehension. Journal of Memory and Language, 38(3), 283-312. 
Milham, M. P., Banich, M. T., & Barad, V. (2003). Competition for priority in 
processing increases prefrontal cortex’s involvement in top-down control: an 
event-related fMRI study of the Stroop task. Cognitive brain research, 17(2), 
212-222. 
Miller, E. K., & Cohen, J. D. (2001). An integrative theory of prefrontal cortex 
function. Annual review of neuroscience, 24(1), 167-202. 
31 
 
Miyake, A., Just, M. A., & Carpenter, P. A. (1994). Working Memory Constraints on 
the Resolution of Lexical Ambiguity: Maintaining Multiple Interpretations in 
Neutral Contexts. Journal of Memory and Language, 33(2), 175-202. 
Mummery, C. J., Patterson, K., Price, C. J., Ashburner, J., Frackowiak, R. S. J., & 
Hodges, J. R. (2000). A voxel-based morphometry study of semantic 
dementia: relationship between temporal lobe atrophy and semantic 
memory. Annals of neurology, 47(1), 36-45. 
Nixon, P., Lazarova, J., Hodinott-Hill, I., Gough, P., & Passingham, R. (2004). The 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus and Phonological Processing: An Investigation using 
rTMS. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 16(2), 289-300. 
Nobre, A. C., Allison, T., & McCarthy, G. (1994). Word recognition in the human 
inferior temporal lobe. Nature, 372(6503), 260-263. 
Novick, J. M., Kan, I. P., Trueswell, J. C., & Thompson-Schill, S. L. (2009). A case 
for conflict across multiple domains: Memory and language impairments 
following damage to ventrolateral prefrontal cortex. Cognitive 
Neuropsychology, 26(6), 527-567. 
Novick, J. M., Trueswell, J. C., & Thompson-Schill, S. L. (2005). Cognitive control 
and parsing: Reexamining the role of Broca's area in sentence 
comprehension. Cognitive Affective & Behavioral Neuroscience, 5(3), 263-
281. 
Onifer, W., & Swinney, D. A. (1981). Accessing lexical ambiguities during sentence 
comprehension: Effects of frequency of meaning and contextual bias. 
Memory & Cognition, 9(3), 225-236. 
Penfield, W., & Roberts, L. (1959). Speech and brain mechanisms. 
Persson, J., Sylvester, C.-Y. C., Nelson, J. K., Welsh, K. M., Jonides, J., & Reuter-
Lorenz, P. A. (2004). Selection requirements during verb generation: 
32 
 
differential recruitment in older and younger adults. Neuroimage, 23(4), 
1382-1390. 
Price, C. J., & Devlin, J. T. (2003). The myth of the visual word form area. 
Neuroimage, 19(3), 473-481. 
Price, C. J., & Devlin, J. T. (2011). The Interactive Account of ventral 
occipitotemporal contributions to reading. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 
15(6), 246-253. 
Robinson, G., Shallice, T., & Cipolotti, L. (2005). A failure of high level verbal 
response selection in progressive dynamic aphasia. Cognitive 
Neuropsychology, 22(6), 661-694. 
Rodd, J. M., Berriman, R., Landau, M., Lee, T., Ho, C., Gaskell, M. G., et al. (2012). 
Learning new meanings for old words: effects of semantic relatedness. 
Memory & Cognition, 40(7), 1095-1108. 
Rodd, J. M., Davis, M. H., & Johnsrude, I. S. (2005). The neural mechanisms of 
speech comprehension: fMRI studies of semantic ambiguity. Cerebral 
Cortex, 15(8), 1261-1269. 
Rodd, J. M., Gaskell, M. G., & Marslen-Wilson, W. (2002). Making sense of 
semantic ambiguity: Semantic competition in lexical access. Journal of 
Memory and Language, 46(2), 245-266. 
Rodd, J. M., Johnsrude, I. S., & Davis, M. H. (2010). The role of domain-general 
frontal systems in language comprehension: Evidence from dual-task 
interference and semantic ambiguity. Brain and Language, 115(3), 182-188. 
Rodd, J. M., Johnsrude, I. S., & Davis, M. H. (2012). Dissociating frontotemporal 
contributions to semantic ambiguity resolution in spoken sentences. Cerebral 
Cortex, 22(8), 1761-1773. 
33 
 
Rodd, J. M., Longe, O. A., Randall, B., & Tyler, L. K. (2010). The functional 
organisation of the fronto-temporal language system: Evidence from 
syntactic and semantic ambiguity. Neuropsychologia, 48(5), 1324-1335. 
Rodd, J. M., Lopez Cutrin, B., Kirsch, H., Millar, A., & Davis, M. H. (2013). Long-
term priming of the meanings of ambiguous words. Journal of Memory and 
Language, 68(2), 180-198. 
Rodd, J. M., Vitello, S., Woollams, A. M., & Adank, P. (2015). Localising semantic 
and syntactic processing in spoken and written language comprehension: 
And activation likelihood estimation meta-analysis. Brain and Language, 141, 
89-102. 
Rogalsky, C., & Hickok, G. (2011). The role of Broca's area in sentence 
comprehension. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 23(7), 1664-1680. 
Rogalsky, C., Matchin, W., & Hickok, G. (2008). Broca's area, sentence 
comprehension, and working memory: an fMRI study. Frontiers in human 
neuroscience, 2. 
Schwartz, M. F., Saffran, E. M., & Marin, O. S. M. (1980). The word order problem in 
agrammatism. I. Comprehension. Brain and Language, 10(2), 249-262. 
Scott, S. K., Blank, C. C., Rosen, S., & Wise, R. J. (2000). Identification of a 
pathway for intelligible speech in the left temporal lobe. Brain, 123(12), 2400-
2406. 
Seidenberg, M. S., Tanenhaus, M. K., Leiman, J. M., & Bienkowski, M. (1982). 
Automatic access of the meanings of ambiguous words in context: Some 
limitations of knowledge-based processing. Cognitive Psychology, 14(4), 
489-537. 
Simpson, G. B. (1994). Context and the processing of ambiguous words. Handbook 
of psycholinguistics, 22, 359-374. 
34 
 
Snijders, T., Vosse, T., Kempen, G., Van Berkum, J. J. A., Petersson, K. M., & 
Hagoort, P. (2009). Retrieval and unification of syntactic structure in 
sentence comprehension: An fMRI study using word-category ambiguity. 
Cerebral Cortex, 19, 1493–1503. 
Spitsyna, G., Warren, J. E., Scott, S. K., Turkheimer, F. E., & Wise, R. J. (2006). 
Converging language streams in the human temporal lobe. J Neurosci, 
26(28), 7328-7336. 
Strand, F., Forssberg, H., Klingberg, T., & Norrelgen, F. (2008). Phonological 
working memory with auditory presentation of pseudo-words—an event 
related fMRI study. Brain research, 1212, 48-54. 
Swinney, D. (1979). Lexical access during sentence comprehension: 
(Re)consideration of context effects. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal 
Behavior, 18(6), 645-659. 
Tabossi, P. (1988). Accessing lexical ambiguity in different types of sentential 
contexts. Journal of Memory and Language, 27(3), 324-340. 
Tabossi, P., & Zardon, F. (1993). Processing Ambiguous Words in Context. Journal 
of Memory and Language, 32(3), 359-372. 
Tahmasebi A., Davis M.H., Wild, C., Rodd, J.M., Hakyemez, H., Abolmaesumi, P., 
Johnsrude I.S. (2012). Is the link between anatomical structure and function 
equally strong at all cognitive levels of processing? Cerebral Cortex, 22 (7), 
1593-1603.Thompson-Schill, S. L., D'Esposito, M., Aguirre, G. K., & Farah, 
M. J. (1997). Role of left inferior prefrontal cortex in retrieval of semantic 
knowledge: A reevaluation. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the United States of America, 94(26), 14792-14797. 
Twilley, L. C., & Dixon, P. (2000). Meaning resolution processes for words: A 
parallel independent model. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 7(1), 49-82. 
35 
 
Tyler L.K., Cheung T.P.L., Devereux B.J., Clarke A. (2013). Syntactic computations 
in the language network: Characterizing dynamic network properties using 
representational similarity analysis. Frontiers in Psychology, 4 (MAY). 
Vitello, S. (2014). Cognitive and Neural Mechanisms Underlying Semantic Ambiguity 
Resolution. (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). University College London. 
Vitello, S., Warren, J. E., Devlin, J. T., & Rodd, J. M. (2014). Role of frontal and 
temporal regions in reinterpreting semantically ambiguous sentences. 
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8 (JULY). 
Wagner, A. D., Paré-Blagoev, J. E., Clark, J., & Poldrack, R. A. (2001). Recovering 
meaning: left prefrontal cortex guides controlled semantic retrieval. Neuron, 
31(2), 329-338. 
Whitney, C., Kirk, M., O'Sullivan, J., Lambon Ralph, M. A., & Jefferies, E. (2011). 
The neural organization of semantic control: TMS evidence for a distributed 
network in left inferior frontal and posterior middle temporal gyrus. Cereb 
Cortex, 21(5), 1066-1075. 
Willems, R. M., Özyürek, A., & Hagoort, P. (2007). When language meets action: 
the neural integration of gesture and speech. Cerebral Cortex, 17(10), 2322-
2333. 
Xiang, H., Fonteijn, H. M., Norris, D. G., & Hagoort, P. (2010). Topographical 
functional connectivity pattern in the perisylvian language networks. Cerebral 
Cortex, 20(3), 549-560. 
Yee, E., Blumstein, S. E., & Sedivy, J. C. (2008). Lexical-Semantic Activation in 
Broca's and Wernicke's Aphasia: Evidence from Eye Movements. Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 20(4), 592-612. 
36 
 
Zempleni, M. Z., Renken, R., Hoeks, J. C. J., Hoogduin, J. M., & Stowe, L. A. 
(2007). Semantic ambiguity processing in sentence context: Evidence from 
event-related fMRI. NeuroImage, 34(3), 1270-1279. 
 
